capitalism'. A Cold War relationship existed between the disciplines of cultural studies and business studies, characterized by a strong sense of difference and mutual opposition so marked that it often formed part of the self-identification of people on both sides. This was less than a decade ago.
But, even then, a powerful voice for change was already proposing a quite different relationship between 'culture' and 'business'. Tony Bennett and others promoting cultural policy studies favoured engagement over opposition; working with corporate and governmental institutions rather than avoiding them like the plague (see, for example, Bennett, 1998) . Bennett set the rules of engagement for 'talking to the Ideological State Apparatuses'. Difference, critique and the analysis of power were not abandoned; they were expressed, for instance, in a clear preference for public, institutional European culture over market-driven, private American consumerism. But the idea that those who studied culture were sworn enemies of those who studied business began to fade. A period of détente followed, at least among those negotiating across the 'demilitarized zone' (DMZ) of cultural policy studies.
Lately, something even more remarkable seems to have been happening. Cultural studies has grown so pervasively that it has begun to dissolve into its other. It has ceased to maintain itself as different from the commercial and governmental cultures it purports to explain. No longer is the very identity of the analyst founded on those Cold War oppositions. Business journals like Harvard Business Review are full of articles about creativity (Flew, 2004a, b) . Humanists and creatives are talking to business faculties. They're even doing business -trying to grow jobs and GDP in the creative economy for their own cities and regions. We have entered a period where partnership and mutual benefit determine our relationships; where the project, the external environment and the opportunity are more important than a disciplinary or political 'position' that is known in advance.
Not surprisingly, there is currently a sort of wonderment and anxiety about this development and a good deal of suspicion, not least about what's happened to people's own 'erstwhile theoretical selves'. Can those whose intellectual formation was achieved in discourses that were founded on critique, and can those whose practices were founded on what Margaret Thatcher once proclaimed a mission to chase the 'dark clouds of Marxism' from the land, talk to each other? Are we 'teaching capitalism'? Are they teaching communism? If so, shouldn't everyone be ashamed of themselves and get back to the barricades?
The rules of engagement have changed again as cultural studies expands into business discourses and vice versa. But many of those Cold War oppositions and prejudices persist. A continuing suspicion of commercial culture remains on the part of those whose disciplinary training includes the study of creative forms -in the humanities and social sciences broadly, not just in my own field. So we need to be clear about where that training may be leading us. The intellectual's default setting of adversarial critique may still be valuable in order to retain proper vigilance and scepticism, but it may also cause us to prejudge phenomena and misdiagnose situations, which in turn may lead to poor policy proposals and a failure (once again?) materially to assist the various groups and causes whose interests we will literally misguide.
What follows argues that culture 'out there' has changed, as has the institutional setting for studying it, but that some of our most cherished intellectual settings have not changed and may, by that token, be an impediment to understanding what's going on.
The 'value chain' of meaning
In business rhetoric, a 'value chain' is a banal concept. At one end of the process of shifting goods are origination and the producer; in the middle is found the commodity and its distribution; at the other end is the consumer or end user, thus:
'Value chain analysis' is a managerial process designed to pay proper attention to the possibilities of increasing revenue and cutting costs all along that chain, not just in the process of manufacturing or production (see Porter, 1998: 45-52) . Businesses like to add value at all points in the chain. Recently, consumers have been the focus of intense value-adding initiatives. For instance, customers at furniture stores like Ikea supply their own labour to assemble the goods they buy. Users of interactive computer games like The Sims contribute to the development of the game itself. It is not just 'user pays'; it is also 'user makes'. Where Fordist manufacturers once relied on control of the production process to control the generation of value, now they need to pay attention to the experience of consumption (see Cheskin, 2002) .
Their interest in culture is hardly surprising. The source of value is no longer to be found only in the scale and organization of manufacturing industry alone; it is also to be found among the uses and creativity of consumers themselves. Garnering value is no longer merely a matter of the bottom line, which itself has tripled in order to accommodate contextual values (Leadbeater, 1999: 10-12) . It is now also a matter of partnership with customers.
If meaning has a value chain, then it links the author (producer), via the text (commodity, distribution), to the reader (consumer) thus:
Value chain of goods and services:
Origination/Production Commodity/Distribution Consumer/Use
Thinking about Euro-American western culture, value has been added to meaning over time by progressively extending its supposed source across the chain as a whole. The place where people have looked in order to determine what something means has drifted down the chain. In 'epochal' terms, the extension of meaning to the next link in the value chain can be seen to correlate closely to successive historical periods thus:
In the premodern (medieval) period, the source of meaning was understood to be divine, fixed in texts such as the Bible by the Judeo-Christian God. Authorial intention was therefore unarguable: a text meant what its (divine) producer said it did. All that remained for readers to do was to work out what the author 'meant'. Priests were on hand to provide that service.
In modern times (taking modernity to coincide with the inauguration of popular sovereignty, industrialization, the Enlightenment, and so on), meaning was sourced to the distributed commodity itself: in this case, the text. Locating the source of meaning in the 'thing itself' was the basis of empiricism and realism, the scientific observation of actually existing objects, documents or (precisely) 'sources' to determine the truth. Texts were objects (and vice versa) and they meant exactly what they themselves said. This was also the heyday of modernist literary criticism and scientific semiotics. Literary readers must get at meaning themselves, without the help of authorities, by using techniques such as I.A. Richards's practical criticism (1964) : close critical reading of the text without reference to contextual features. Meanwhile, linguists hoped to be able to reduce meaning to a 'science of signs'. For better or worse, contemporary academics, intellectuals and critics are 'modernist'; they are trained to source meaning to its commodity form.
In contemporary times (since the Second World War), the source of meaning has drifted to the other end of the value chain. It is taken to reside in the consumer: the audience or reader. Given the anonymous popular sovereignty of mass democracy, this was an egalitarian approach to meaning. It required large-scale sampling and ethnographic methods to get The way to find out what something meant, from an event in the news to the outcome of TV shows, was not to inquire into the intentions of the producer, nor even to analyse the text, but to source meaning to the consumer by polling, ratings, survey and sample -by plebiscite. It ought to be said straightaway that each succeeding era does not supplant, but typically supplements, what has gone before, just as new media do. Thus, in the contemporary period, there are plenty of examples of both modern and premodern relationships to meaning.
The drift of meanings
Extending this periodization of value chains in meanings and merchandise further, it is interesting to look at the institutions, relations and personnel involved in siting the source of meaning at different points along the chain in different periods. To begin with, it is clear that different populations have been invoked by different assumptions about the source of meaning.
In the medieval period, with a divine author, the population comprised the 'laity' or the 'faithful'. They needed priests to mediate between themselves and meaning's supposed source. They looked to the church as a physical location for that encounter.
But, in modern times, after Milton and Johnson, the laity were secularized and became the reading public and (thence, I argue) 'the' public. The intermediary was the publisher -of pamphlet, newspaper, scientific treatise, literature, fiction, useful knowledge, official information, intelligence, and so on. The location for these meanings was an already virtualized public sphere -the imagined co-readership of documentary sources on the 'public record'.
In the contemporary period, the source of meaning has shifted to the 'DIY citizen' (Hartley, 1999) ; its location has shifted to private life and the consumer market. The intermediary now is marketing itself -PR, integrated marketing communication (IMC) or 'marcom', spin, information management, and so on:
In a post-9/11, post-Bali environment, it may be salutary to reflect that meanings can be a matter of life and death and of lethal force. The source of meaning could be disputed at the point of the sword. During the same historical periods noted above, power, force and enmity also shifted along the chain, drifting from the sovereigns and feudal lords who wielded 'pain of death', to the modern institutions and abstract entities for and (therefore) against which one was recruited to fight, to the frontline of contemporary warfare -the battle of identities:
British diplomat Robert Cooper argues that contemporary states may be classified in the same way: as premodern or 'Hobbesian' (Somalia, Taliban Afghanistan); modern or 'Machiavellian' (China, India, Pakistan); and postmodern (postimperial countries like the UK, Germany and France) (Cooper, 2002) . Robert Kagan has added to the debate, dubbing 'postmodern' states 'Kantian'. Kagan argues that this typology explains why the US and Europe are experiencing troublingly divergent strategic cultures: 'Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus ' (2003: 3) . In other words, the drift of meaning has strategic effects where modern states like the USA rely on power and hegemony, while postmodern polities like the EU (and the postimperial nations within it) are force-averse and 'security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability' (Cooper, 2002) .
In the realm of knowledge itself, the mode of inquiry appropriate to discovering and communicating meaning changed also, requiring quite different philosophical and epistemological approaches to deal with the drift of meaning along the value chain.
In medieval times, truth was revealed. To find its source required an understanding of 'authorial intentions' which, in this context, meant theology. Not too many people were needed for that, so education was restricted to the caste of literate clerics.
In modern times, truth was regarded as a scarce good -an indivisible unity -and, while people might contend over it, they could not pluralize and therefore share bits and pieces of it (Milton agonizes over the metaphor of the post-lapsarian dismemberment of truth in Aeropagitica, a founding document of modernity). Truth was like power: a zero-sum game. If I had it, you didn't; if I lacked it, I had to take it from someone in order to possess it. This notion governed the period when secular modernists hoped that knowledge was a coherent unity (albeit with many disciplinary 'branches'), and they set about educating their own mass populations into sufficient literacy to be able to add value to it by scientific observation and empirical application. But, in contemporary times, truth has multiplied and fragmented, just as power has. In these days of difference, diversity and diaspora, truth has become inclusive, plentiful (see Hartley, 2003) . It is revealed by plebiscite. Education is no longer purposed for the literate mass workforce only, but for universal learning services available on a commercial, customized 'borderless' basis to anyone, anywhere, of any age, thus: Interestingly, while schooling was 'modernized' into the form of mass education a century or more ago, tertiary education has only recently taken this path outside of the USA (Robbins in the 1960s in the UK; Dawkins in the 1980s in Australia). But social democratic governments are already pushing on towards 'universal' provision in the tertiary sector by a combination of further and higher education, augmented by voluntary and commercial learning services and mediated learning institutions ranging from initiatives such as the Open University, University for Industry and the National Health Service University in the UK to Shanghai Television University in China. Ironically, traditional universities are busily modernizing themselves, shedding their medieval web of collegiate obligation and academic freedom to take on the scale, organization and efficiency of modernist industry just at the moment when the creative/service economy is moving beyond that modernist paradigm.
What is the method required to identify meanings? In medieval times, it was biblical exegesis and the 'concordance' or commentary on sacred texts, both of which were secularized in the modern period in the form of literary criticism. But such criticism could no longer be anchored in the 'intentions of the author'. The preferred method was sceptical observation and attention to the empirical form and properties of the object of study -criticism became a form of 'scientific' method designed to dissect and anatomize the textual specimen. However, it no longer suffices because texts cannot by What philosophy, epistemology, scale of education?
Revelation
Scarcity Plenty
Theology Empiricism Plebiscite Elite Mass Universal
themselves mean what they say. Readers, audiences and consumers, within a situated context of experience, decide what texts mean; indeed, because there is just too much readily accessible and available meaning out there among the millions of people, media, sites and sources, the method of determining meaning from among consumers is itself a creative process -but an editorial not an authorial one -using a textual practice that I have labelled 'redaction' (Hartley, 2000 (Hartley, , 2003 . Redaction (the creative editorial practice of bringing existing materials together to make new texts and meanings) is both the art form of the age and a method for representing meanings sourced to consumers. Redaction has added value to the end of meaning's value chain. The new method is to 'edit people's choices' (this phrase was used by a clothing designer at a recent conference to explain what fashion designers do).
Meanwhile, the characteristic creative form of each era changes: in medieval times, it's the liturgy in the cathedral -that combination of space, paint, glass, smoke, song, sight, spectacle and ritualized actions that cohere around the glorification of the superhuman source of meaning. In modern times, it's realism -journalism in the realm of fact; the prose novel in that of fiction. Now it is 'reality' -factual and fictional performances that promise some element of transparency, universality, participation and interactivity with the audience, thus: Such developments were accompanied by, and required, changes in literacy, of which they were also a symptom.
In the medieval era, audiences were just that -they 'audited' what authors had created. Literacy needed to be 'hear only', whether in church or theatre. Audiences only had to hear the divine word in the liturgy and sermon.
Modern audiences were true readers, but their literacy was largely 'read only'. In order to partake of public life in democratic societies, for instance, the modern citizen had to be able to read the newspapers, but not write for them.
The contemporary period is witnessing a further change in literacy -the popular audience is achieving a 'read and write' capacity in publicly distributed media via its participation in shows like Big Brother and in private communication, where digital equipment for making audiovisual texts and messages is close to achieving the banal and autonomous status of the pen:
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What interpretive and creative form?
Exegesis
Criticism Redaction Ritual Realism 'Reality'
How do you talk to such folk? The 'mode of address' has changed from one that was designed to convert hearers to the faith, via one that wanted to convince readers to give their loyalty to a party or brand, a cause or campaign, to one seeking to converse with customers who might also be suppliers, competitors or partners: Table 1 summarizes these ideas. If the categories are read 'vertically', it becomes clear that more than cultural history is at stake. Ideological commitments are bound up with each column and its internal transformations:
1 fundamentalism: the premodern era, centred on the author and production; 2 modernism: the modern era, centred on the commodity, text and distribution; and 3 postmodernism/globalization: centred on the consumer and audience.
This exercise reveals that some terms are associated with categories that don't sit very easily with our habitual self-understandings. I would guess that most contemporary intellectuals, whether academics or activists, policy wallahs or journalists, are most comfortable with the terms in the middle column. For most practical purposes, 'we' are modernists. But the categories of 'production' and 'the author', to which many are still devoted from political economists to film critics, appear here in the context of fundamentalism. Is it possible that we are too wedded to ideas of primacy, causation and prestige that are simply medieval? Should we be so certain that causation flows just one way? Do we love authors and production for merely metaphysical reasons? Is there a hint of clerisy in our desire to teach populations what 'we know' rather than what 'they want' and to regard the extension of meaning as 'dumbing down' rather than 'democratization'?
In political and cultural movements at large, it is clear that column one has not lost its force except in the 'regime' category (at least in the West). Politicians can recruit votes by stirring up residual allegiances associated with premodern categories while certain movements associated with religious fundamentalism actively pursue the society-wide reinstatement of column one characteristics. So this periodization of the drift of meaning along the value chain does not imply 'progress' from one column to the next.
On the contrary, the terms in column three include many of the most contested, derided, 'unworthy' categories in current public discourse. That column also includes some terms that haven't been invented yet, being neologisms of my own coinage -terms required to identify, and to bring forward for analysis, newly emerging phenomena to which modernist thinking is almost completely blind, in particular the concepts of plebiscite, redaction, the DIY citizen and 'read and write' literacy for post-broadcast media content. I'm suggesting that intellectual inquiry based on modernist (and some premodern) categories -a devotion to the public sphere, print literacy, the nation state, government(ality), empiricism, criticism, realism, the publicis not necessarily best placed to understand culture and business organized around a newly emerging paradigm: consumption, the reader or audience, postmodernism, private life, marcom, the self, the 'plenitude of the possible' (Foucault, 1984: 267) , analysis by plebiscite, universal education, redaction, 'reality', the DIY citizen. In the face of such contemporary phenomena, modernists are apt to revert to adversarial thinking; it's the Cold War all over again. But perhaps the casus belli isn't so much the culture as the categorization. Meanwhile, the object of study -culture 'out there' -has moved to a different place where modernist analysis will simply misunderstand it.
The new economy, creativity and consumption in the value chain
This amounts to a kind of critical 'parallax error' where the object of analysis is in a different position from the point of observation. Thus, my prescription for the analysis of 'the new economy, creativity and consumption' is not to start from inherited presumptions (fundamentalist or modernist) about what 'consumption' means, where it fits and what it connects with, but rather to look directly at the way cultural practices themselves are organized and reproduced to try to explain how the drift of the source of meaning to the 'reader' end of the chain of communication is working itself through in various categories and media.
What is creativity?
In this context, it is 'reality', redaction and the plebiscite; it is:
• interactive and multiplatform 'reality' forms from Big Brother to Fat Cow Motel;
• edited (redactional) media like Google News (http://news.google.com/), which searches and browses 4000 news sources to present top stories, proudly proclaiming that their selection and placement were 'determined automatically by a computer programme';
• the use of the technologies of interactive media literacy by ordinary (nonprofessional, unpaid) people for autonomous communication, for example via the myriad 'jennicams' and other webcam formats, webzines, bloggers and posts, the use of messenger services (email), sms (text messaging), and so on; and 
What is the new economy?
It's knowledge Jim, but not as we know it. Not disciplinary or explicit scientific knowledge, but tacit 'craft' knowledge, the recipe (as Charles Leadbeater said [1999: 28-36] ), intangibles, IP. For the purposes of this article, it's a knowledge economy that connects contemporary private life and the DIY citizen, via universally available ('borderless') learning services, to products and services that rely on customization and 'conversation'; human interaction via technologies. It is characterized by the world of 'work but not jobs', portfolio careers and casualized labour. It is IP and the struggle between those who wish to hang on to theirs (nations as well as persons) versus those who are hoovering up copyright for monetization (for example, the Hulton Getty photo library).
What is consumption?
It appears that consumers are being treated as the 'source of meaning', although that doesn't necessarily make them either sovereign or even especially interactive. Something to look out for here is not the ways that corporations and businesses try to add value upon the body of the consumer (although that needs attention, as does the idea of consumption as labour), but in a longue durée anthropological frame, it will be important to follow the impetus that prods the resources of interactive media ever further into the fabric of human communication as an ordinary and universally used 'read and write' literacy (like a pen). Barriers between producers and consumers, currently organized around divisions of labour such as professional and amateur, expensive and cheap, are delineating new relations of consumption.
All this suggests that universities and other institutions of formal knowledge need to think about their own situations. Our own knowledge values and learning services are caught up in the extension of the value chains of goods and meaning towards the consumer. We -modernist intellectuals working in barely post-medieval institutions -are no longer self-evidently the source, the provider. One implication of the emergence of the new economy, creativity and consumption is that now 'we' have serious competition. We've dissolved into our other, but so has our value.
